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STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL
COMMON LAW:
MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS
Federal courts traditionally engage in interstitial lawmaking by in-
terpreting congressional legislation.' Acknowledging this function,
the United States Supreme Court in 19722 indicated that, absent ger-
mane federal water pollution legislation, the judicially formulated
federal common law of nuisance provides a remedy for interstate
water pollution.3 Shortly thereafter, Congress, recognizing prior fed-
1. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143 n.17 (1978). See United
States v. Little Misre Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("the inevitable incomplete-
ness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal law-making is a basic
responsibility of the federal courts").
Commentators have also recognized that effective constitutionalism necessitates
federal judicial competence to formulate federal common law to supplement estab-
lished federal statutory programs. See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 419-21 (1964); Mishkin, The Vari-
ousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957).
2. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 40-42.
3. Id. The Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee declared that congressional enactments
prohibiting or controlling pollution of interstate or navigable waters were not the ex-
clusive means by which federal courts may protect the federal policy concerning the
quality of water under federal jurisdiction. Id. at 103. The Court recognized, how-
ever, Congress' power to preempt federal common law through statute or authorized
administrative regulations. Id. at 107.
A state can bring suit in federal court on the basis of its sovereign interest in the
integrity of its waters. The federal interest in the quality of interstate waters, evi-
denced by the substantial amount of federal water quality legislation, supports appli-
cation of federal law in such situations. Leypold, Federal Common Law: Judicially
Established Elluent Standards as a Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 314 (1978).
In Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court broadened
the scope of Illinois v. Milwaukee's holding to the problem of air pollution. The
Court observed that Congress had not established a uniform national solution to all
aspects of air pollution. Indeed, Congress had expressly stated that "prevention and
control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments." Id. at 114, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1976). The Court in Gen-
eral Motors recognized that the law, as well as practical necessity, mandate that cor-
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eral statutory water quality programs' deficiencies,4 enacted the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCAA or
Amendments) of 1972.1 Federal courts interpreted the FWPCAA as
supplementing the existing rights and remedies under the federal
common law of nuisance.6 In Milwaukee v. Illinois,7 the Supreme
Court rejected this view and held that the FWPCAA fully preempted
the federal common law's water pollution remedies.8
In 1972, Illinois sought original jurisdiction from the Supreme
rective remedies for air pollution be considered in the context of localized situations.
406 U.S. at 116. To accomplish this desired end, the Court held that cases should be
heard in the appropriate federal district courts. Id.
Not all courts have extended Illinois v. Milwaukee beyond its express language. In
Committee for Jones Fall Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), a divided Fourth Circuit refused to broaden Illinois v. Milwaukee to include an
action brought by an association of community organizations and citizens in which
there was no interstate effect. Id. at 1010.
4. From its two-year study of the federal water pollution control program, the
Senate Committee on Public Works concluded "the national effort to abate and con-
trol water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect." S. REP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 12 (1971).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, prior to the 1972 amendments, pre-
scribed a regulatory system consisting primarily of state developed ambient water
standards applicable to interstate or navigable waters. Required standards for any
particular activity depended upon the priorities the state wanted to facilitate. The
water quality protection system failed due to the lack, not infeasibility, of enforce-
ment of state standards. R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL CASES AND
MATERIALS 48 (1981).
5. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
6. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S.
304 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979); United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979).
See also District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 864 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(court quoting with apparent approval Seventh Circuit's decision in Illinois v. Mil-
waukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979)); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1980) (federal common law supplements FWPCAA), vacated and re-
manded, 451 U.S. 917 (1981) (for further consideration in light of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616
F.2d 1222, 1233 n.31 (3d Cir. 1980) (FWPCAA does not preclude an independent
federal common law nuisance remedy), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (for
further consideration in light of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)); Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1061-62 (D.P.R. 1981)
(FWPCAA does not preempt federal common law of nuisance), vacated and re-
manded sub nonm Marques-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (Ist Cir. 1981).
7. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
8. Id. at 317.
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Court9 to block the City of Milwaukee from discharging untreated
sewage"° into Lake Michigan." The Court refused to exercise its
original jurisdiction, but recognized that Illinois could invoke the
federal common law of nuisance to obtain an injunction barring Mil-
waukee's discharge of pollutants.' 2
Subsequent to Illinois' filing of suit in federal district court, 3 Con-
gress enacted the FWPCAA.' 4 The Amendments authorized quali-
fied state agencies to establish new water quality standards in
conformance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regula-
tions. 15 The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, in compli-
ance with the FWPCAA regulatory scheme, issued a sewage
discharge permit to the City of Milwaukee.' 6 Thereafter, however,
the district court' 7 found that Milwaukee's sewage discharge prac-
tices constituted a nuisance under federal common law and ordered
the city to comply with discharge levels more stringent18 than those
that the Wisconsin permit required. 9 The court, finding that the
9. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972).
10. 406 U.S. at 93. Illinois claimed the Milwaukee area alone discharged approxi-
mately 200 million gallons of raw or untreated sewage and other waste minerals into
Lake Michigan. Id. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court noted
that untreated sewage contains pathogen concentrations. ld. at 309. The sewage dis-
charges foster eutrophication, a process that gradually increases nutrient concentrates
in a body of water. This causes increasing concentrates of phytoplankton, which in
turn leads to reduced clarity and oxygen content, noxious gases, and eventually to the
"death" of the lake through vegetative overgrowth. Id.
11. 406 U.S. at 91.
12. Id.
13. Illinois ex rel Scott v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. IIl. 1973).
14. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-
1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
16. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 311.
17. 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. IlM. 1973).
18. Id. When the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.
1979), it found that the district court had not created new arbitrary requirements, but
simply enforced Illinois discharge requirements. The court noted that the district
court's holding required Milwaukee's discharges to contain less than five milligrams
per liter (mg/I) of deoxygenating wastes (BOD) and five mg/i of suspended solids.
Id. at 173-74. The standards enforced were nearly identical to those in effect under
Illinois law for discharges into Lake Michigan from sources within Illinois. Id. at
173. Illinois limited discharges to a content not exceeding four mg/I BOD and five
mg/l suspended solids. ILL. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD RULES AND REGULA-
TIONS, ch. 3 § 404(d) (standards effective December 31, 1974).
19. 451 U.S. at 312. See also id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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FWPCAA's language neither "expressly [n]or clearly manifested" an
intent to derogate federal common law principles, held that the estab-
lished federal common law rights and remedies survived the
Amendments.2"
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part.21 The court agreed that the FWPCAA did not preempt federal
common law, but found that the district court had erred in ordering
relief exceeding the FWPCAA authorized standards. 22 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's preemption test.23 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,24 distinguished the tests for
congressional preemption of state law and congressional preemption
of federal common law.25 The Court ruled that separation of powers'
principles require that federal courts defer to expressions of congres-
sional policy.2" Accordingly, the Court held that the FWPCAA fully
preempted existing federal common law of nuisance rights and
remedies.27
Federal common law has an essential function in our federal sys-
tem of government.28 As a sovereign entity within the federal system,
20. 366 F. Supp. at 300. This constituted an application of the previously estab-
lished test. See Isbrandsten v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952) (held that it is well settled
that statutes will not be construed in derogation of common law unless "such intent is
clear from the words of the statute.").
21. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated, 451 U.S. 304
(1981).
22. 599 F.2d at 177.
23. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
24. Six justices joined the Court's opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion, which Justices Marshall and Stevens joined. Id. at 332.
25. 451 U.S. at 316-17.
26. Id. at 317.
27. Id. at 320.
28. The Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
421-27 (1964), held that where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism or
where an overriding federal interest in the need of a uniform rule of decision exists,
federal courts apply federal common law. See also Illinois v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 917 (1981) (nation has an
overriding interest, explicit in the FWPCAA, in interstate and navigable waters and
in developing a uniform program of protecting these waters from pollution); United
States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (D.C. Conn. 1980) (the
strong federal interest in controlling certain types of pollution and protecting the en-
vironment forms the basis of federal common law causes of action).
The value of federal common law is its ability to respond and adapt itself to evolv-
ing concepts of legal procedure and social equity. Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nui-
sance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 EcoLoGY L.Q.
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states have the authority to regulate intrastate affairs not preempted
by the federal government.29 In exercising this power, however, the
impact of a state's actions may extend beyond its boundaries, impair-
ing the sovereignty of neighboring states.3 ° Resolving such disputes
poses difficult jurisdictional problems.31 Recognizing that such dis-
241, 275 (1972). Conversely, statutes alone usually provide only inflexible guidelines
that are incapable of adequately responding to changing environmental situations.
Another commentator suggests the creation of a federal common law remedy for
abatement of interstate pollution would supplement rather than supplant the legisla-
tive process. See Note, .4 Comparison of Texas v. Pankey and Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp. Reveals the Necessityfor a Common Law Right to Abate Interstate
Pollution, 50 TEx. L. REV. 183, 189 n.31 (1971). See generally Note, State Ecological
Rights Arising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 597, 602. For a fur-
ther discussion of the necessity for interstitial lawmaking, see supra note 1.
29. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 278 (1976).
30. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, federal jurisdiction over cases involving inter-
state disputes "rests on [the] plain proposition that the peace of the whole ought not
be left at the disposal of a part." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 588 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Hamilton ed. 1869). In Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Court declared
that, "[o]ne cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states to each other, is the
equality of right. Each state stands on the same level as the rest. It can impose its
legislation on no one of the others and is boundto yield its own view to none." Id. at
97. It does not follow that because Congress cannot determine the rule which shall
control between two states or because a state may not enforce its policies on its neigh-
bor that the controversy ceases to be one of a justiciable nature. ld. at 98. Through
successive disputes and decisions the Court formulates "what may not improperly be
called interstate common law." Id.
See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972) (question of apportionment of
interstate waters is a question of federal common law upon which statutes are not
conclusive) (dicta); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (a
state's quasi-sovereign interest in its environment should not be circumscribed by in-
adequate pollution laws of neighboring states; one state's ecological rights preclude
interference from other states); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (while
states, as sovereign entities, surrendered diplomatic powers and the right to make war
when they joined the Union, "it was to be expected that upon the [federal govern-
ment] would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy" for protecting a states
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; federal court jurisdiction provides such a rem-
edy); Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L.
REV. 665, 683 (1959). See also Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Stat-
utory Preemption or Preservation?, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 525-26 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Federal Common Law]. For a further discussion of federalism in
interstate environmental quality, see Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Inter-
state Water Quality.- Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARiz. L. REv. 691, 706
(1970).
31. Since 1875, Congress has provided that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." Judiciary Act of 1875, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980). Courts
interpret the word "laws" in § 1331 to include federal judicial decisions as well as
1983]
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putes presented important questions about the operation of the fed-
eral system, federal courts created a justiciable claim under federal
common law.32 This judicially created body of law serves to protect
the sovereign interests of the states from unreasonable interference by
other actors in the federal system.33
Courts have used federal common law to protect states' environ-
mental rights from interstate pollution.34 In Pankey v. Texas,35 the
Tenth Circuit held that where no applicable federal statute exists,
federal common law preserves a state's quasi-sovereign ecological
rights.36 In Pankey, Texas sued to enjoin New Mexico residents from
using an insecticide that threatened to pollute Texas water supplies.
37
The court ruled that federal common law provides a basis for uni-
form rules of decision in cases involving the extraterritorial impair-
ment of a state's environmental rights.38 The court stressed that until
an area of law received comprehensive legislation, federal common
law provides the only adequate remedy for interstate pollution.39
congressional legislation. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972) (fed-
eral courts have extensive responsibility to fashion substantive law in rules, which are
as fully "laws" of the United States as those congressionally enacted); Ivy Broadcast-
ing Co. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968) (rationale of
the 1875 grant of federal question jurisdiction applies to judicially created rights as
well as legislatively created rights). At least one commentator also has recognized
that federal common law is among the "laws of the United States" referred to in the
jurisdictional statute. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 562.
32. C. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 562. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (federal courts resolve problems lacking ex-
press statutory sanction by examining the statutory policy and formulating a remedy
that will effectuate that objective); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308
U.S. 343, 349 (1939) (when Congress neglects to provide for a contingency, it leaves
such remedial details to judicial implication). For a discussion of the power of federal
courts to make common law, see L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 115-19.
33. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (federal common law pro-
tects a state's high water quality standards from impairment by the lower standards of
a neighboring state).
34. See Leypold, supra note 3; Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 30.
35. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
36. Id. at 241.
37. Id. at 236. New Mexico ranchers planned to use the pesticide chlorinated
camphene. Texas alleged that the run-off from rainfall would pollute a river that
provided a major source of water for 11 Texas municipalities. Id.
38. Id. at 240.
39. Id. at 241.
Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual states is,
we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uni-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol24/iss1/10
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Pankey received the Supreme Court's imprimatur in Illinois v. Mil-
waukee.' The Court there held that the federal common law of nui-
sance furnishes a remedy in cases of interstate water pollution.4'
Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous court, stated that federal
courts have the capacity to fashion federal common law where there
is an overriding federal interest requiring a uniform rule of decision
or where the controversy involves basic interests of federalism. 42
Courts also invoke federal common law to supplement the policies
of federal enactments whose provisions inadequately address an in-
terstate dispute.43 In Illinois, for example, the Court ruled that the
use of federal common law was not inconsistent with existing federal
water pollution legislation." Yet, reliance upon judicially created
federal common law to resolve federal disputes when Congress later
enacts applicable legislation raises serious questions about the proper
role of the judiciary in the federal system.45
Both Illinois and Pankey recognized that federal statutory law may
displace federal common law.46 In such instances, federal courts de-
fer to Congress' greater institutional competence to articulate federal
form standard with the environmental rights of a state against improper impair-
ment by sources outside its domain . . . Until the field has been made the
subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards, only
a federal common law basis can provide an adequate means for dealing with
such claims as alleged federal rights.
Id.
40. 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
41. Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 105 n.6.
43. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
44. 406 U.S. at 103-04.
The remedy sought by Illinois is not within the precise scope of remedies pre-
scribed by Congress. Yet the remedies which Congress provides are not neces-
sarily the only federal remedies available ...
The application of federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate
or navigable waters is not inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act.
Id. See also supra note I.
45. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
46. See supra note 39. See also 406 U.S. at 107.
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time
pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to
pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleg-
ing creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.
Id
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policy.47 The mere existence of federal legislation on the subject,
however, does not automatically displace federal common law.48
Federal courts have consistently refused to construe statutes in dero-
gation of federal common law unless it is clear that Congress in-
tended that result.49 Congress' intent in enacting the FWPCAA has
received extensive consideration in this context.
In 1972, Congress, dissatisfied with the ineffective existing federal
water protection statutes and regulations,50 enacted the Amendments
to strengthen the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.5 The
Amendments established a comprehensive long-term policy aimed at
effectively eliminating water pollution. Congress authorized the
EPA to establish pollutant discharge standards for various industrial
categories. Nevertheless, the FWPCAA explicitly preserved the right
of states to regulate intrastate water pollution5 3 Section 5 104 of the
47. Id.
48. See supra note 44.
49. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (even without sav-
ings clause, a common law right survives unless it be found that the right is so repug-
nant that its survival would render the provisions of the statute nugatory); Isbandsten
Co. v. Johnston, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (statutes that encroach upon common law
are to be read with a presumption favoring retention of long-established and familiar
principles when a contrary statutory purpose exists); Texas v. Pacific Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907) (statutory preemption occurs only if a fed-
eral court finds either a statutory provision purporting to abolish the federal common
law of nuisance or a pre-existing right so repugnant to the statute that the survival of
that right renders the statute nugatory); United States ex rel Scott v. United States
Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 559 (N.D. 111. 1973) (to abolish the federal common law
of nuisance a statutory provision purporting such must be present).
50. See supra note 4. See generally H. LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WA-
TERS: THE 1972 WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT (1975).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976).
52. "The major purpose of this legislation is to establish a comprehensive long-
range policy for the elimination of water pollution. . . ." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong.
1st Sess. 95 (1971) (statement of Sen. Jennings Randolph, Chairman of the Senate
Committee that drafted the Senate version of FWPCAA.), reprinted in 2 A LEcISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
1511 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.]. A House sponsor, Representative
Wilmer Mizell, described the bill as "the most far reaching water pollution bill we
have ever drafted . 1. " I LEG. HIST., supra at 369.
The provisions of the FWPCAA exhibit Congress' intent to establish uniform na-
tional water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (establishing national goals
for the elimination of pollution); § 1316(c) (allowing state enforcement only if its
standards comply with federal regulation); and § 1319(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (allowing
Administrator to enforce pollution limitations if state defaults).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V 1981). The FWPCAA expressly acted to "recog-
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Amendments, for example, provides that states retain the right to im-
pose stricter standards than those the EPA promulgated.55 Congress
further recognized that the Act did not displace existing remedies
available to effectuate the federal policy.56 Accordingly, Section
505(e)-the savings clause-establishes a right to seek enforcement
or relief "under any statute or common law." 57
Several decisions have discussed the extent of federal common law
remedies in light of the 1972 Amendments. In United States ex rel.
Scott v. United States Steel Corp. ,58 the court found that the FWP-
nize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of states to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution...." Id.
54. Section 510 provides that:
Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency
to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollu-
tants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except
that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition,
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under this Act,
such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce
any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pre-
treatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent than the
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreat-
ment standard, or standard of performance under this Act; or (2) be construed as
impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with
respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 893.
55. Id. The House Committee Report stated that it considered:
Section 510 to be of extreme importance in assuring the States of the right to
adopt or enforce provisions at least as strict as those established in this legislation.
Thus, the Committee rejected in most instances suggestions for preemption by
the Federal Government and preempted the States only where the situation war-
ranted it based upon the urgent need for uniformity such as in Section 312(f)
relating to marine sanitation devices.
H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972) (emphasis added).
56. 33 U.S.C. 1251(e) (1976). See infra note 57.
57. Section 505(e) provides that: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 86 Stat. 816, 889.
Congress' intent in enacting § 505(e) is well documented. "Section 505(e) would
specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus if damages
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with require-
ments under this act would not be a defense to a common-law action for pollution
damages." H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 134 (1972). See also S. REP. No.
414, 92d Cong. Ist Sess. 81 (1971). See generally Note, Federal Common Law Reme-
dies/or the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 549 (1977).
58. 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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CAA supplemented and amplified the federal common law of nui-
sance. 9 In United States Steel, the United States and Illinois sought
to restrain the defendant from discharging waste water into Lake
Michigan." They asserted that the practice constituted a federal
common law nuisance.6 U.S. Steel contended that the FWPCAA
preempted federal common law.62 The Northern District Court for
Illinois rejected this contention and held that judicial enforcement of
federal common law served both the federal government's proprie-
tary interest in the navigable waters of Lake Michigan and its interest
in establishing a uniform rule of decision.6
The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar reading of the Amendments in
California Tahoe Planning Agency v. Jennings.64 In Jennings, Califor-
nia invoked the federal common law of nuisance to enjoin the con-
struction of hotel casinos on the Lake Tahoe Basin, claiming that the
development would cause an interstate nuisance.65 As in United
States Steel, the defendants countered that federal statutory law dis-
placed federal common law remedies. 6 The Court of Appeals ruled
that neither the Clean Air Act nor the FWPCAA preclude the exist-
ence of the federal common law of nuisance. 7 The court found that
both acts had "citizen suits" provisions, protecting remedies that per-
sons may have under previously existing statutory or common law.68
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the "citizen suits" provisions as pre-
serving federal common law rights and remedies from statutory pre-
emption.69 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of suit as failing to state a claim under the federal common
law of nuisance.7 °
The Seventh Circuit discussed the relationship between federal
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 558-559.
63. Id. at 559.
64. 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 186.
66. Id. at 192.
67. Id. at 193.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 194.
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common law remedies and the FWPCAA in Illinois v. Milwaukee.7'
Defendants contended that the Amendment's comprehensive statu-
tory scheme demonstrated Congress' intent to preempt federal com-
mon law.72 Rejecting this assertion, the Court of Appeals found that
Congress neither "expressly [nior clearly manifested" an intent to
preempt federal common law.73 The court thus explicitly retained
the federal common law of nuisance within the FWPCAA regulatory
scheme.74 The Seventh Circuit attempted to accommodate the stat-
ute, however, by ruling that the remedy for a violation of federal
common law should reflect the "policies and principles" contained
within related federal statutes.7 5
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision on ap-
peal.76 The majority found the "clearly manifested intent" rule inap-
propriate for determining whether a congressional act preempted
common law.7 7 The Court ruled that Congress' traditional role as
articulator of national policy required a standard more solicitous of
this function.78 In his opinion for the Court, however, Justice Rehn-
quist failed to define clearly the new test for preemption.79
71. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id. at 162.
74. Id. at 163. The Seventh Circuit recognized that Congress preserved previ-
ously existing common law rights and remedies to protect the interests of those dem-
onstrating that the requirements imposed pursuant to the federal statute inadequately
protected their interests. Id. at 165. See generally Note, Federal Common Law, supra
note 30, at 528.
75. 599 F.2d at 164.
The conclusion that the Federal Water Control Act, as amended, does not pre-
empt the federal common law of nuisance or limit the relief available in this case
does not render that Act irrelevant. A statute that does not by its terms govern
the case before a court may contain indications of the legislature's judgement in
relevant issues of policy or provide an appropriate principle for decision of the
case. In applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case,
a court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies and principles for
guidance.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court suggested such an approach in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972): "While the various federal environmental
protection statutes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal common
w, they may provide useful guidelines in fashioning such rules of decision." Id.
76. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
77. Id. at 317.
78. Id. at 315-17.
79. Justice Rehnquist suggested at least four possible preemption tests. At various
points in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist indicated that statutory preemption of federal
19831
Washington University Open Scholarship
256 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 24:245
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing between congres-
sional preemption of state law and congressional preemption of fed-
eral common law.8° Justice Rehnquist read the Court's prior cases as
requiring a "clearly manifested intent" only for the former category
of cases.8 He concluded that this more demanding preemption stan-
dard served to protect state power, thereby effecting the diffusion of
power envisioned by the Constitution's system of federalism. 2 The
Justice saw a different set of concerns when the case fell within the
second category.. He emphasized the limited role of a judicially cre-
ated federal common law in light of the Constitution's implicit allo-
cation of policymaking powers to Congress. 83 The Court viewed this
separation of power principle as "too fundamental" to permit federal
courts' continued reliance on federal common law after Congress has
"addressed the problem."84
In reaching its conclusion that the Amendments displaced federal
common law occurs when Congress (1) subjects a federal concern to comprehensive
legislation or authorizes regulation by an expert administrative agency, Id. at 317;
(2) "Thoroughly addresses" a subject, id. at 320; (3) "spoke directly" to a subject, id.
at 315; or "addresses" a subject, id. at 314. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion does
not state whether preemption occurs only when all four criteria are satisfied or if
preemption occurs when only one factor is present.
80. Id. at 316.
Contrary to the suggestions of respondents, the appropriate analysis in determin-
ing if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject of federal
common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal law preempts
state law. In considering the latter question "'we start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress' ". . . While we
have not hesitated to find preemption of state law, whether express or implied,
when Congress has so indicated . . . or when enforcement of state regulations
would impair "federal superintendence of the field," . . . our analysis has in-
cluded "due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, in-
cluding the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism
but as a promoter of democracy". . . Such concerns are not implicated in the
same fashion when the question is whether federal statutory or federal common
law governs, and accordingly the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest
purpose is not required. Indeed, as noted, in cases such as the present "we start
with the assumption" that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.
Id. at 316-17 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 316.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 315. "Our 'commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental'
to continue to rely on federal common law 'by judicially decreeing what accords with
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common law, the Court considered two factors.85 First, it evaluated
the intended breadth and scope of the statute.86 Statements in the
legislative history referring to comprehensiveness of the 1972 amend-
ments8 7 pursuaded the Court that Congress intended to establish an
"all-encompassing" water pollution regulatory scheme.88 Congress'
delegation of supervisory powers for implementing the FWPCAA to
"common sense and the public weal"' when Congress has addressed the problem."
Id. (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
85. In a footnote, the Court stated that "the question whether a previously avail-
able federal common-law action has been displaced by federal statutory law involves
an assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by
Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common law." Id. at
315 n.8.
86. Id. at 315-22.
87. Id. at 317-19.
88. Id. at 318. Justice Rehnquist regarded the FWPCAA as not simply another
law" 'touching interstate waters.'" Id. at 317. He referred to Congress' view that the
amendments were a "'total restructuring'" and "'complete rewriting'" of the ex-
isting water pollution legislation considered by the Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee. Id.
Throughout his opinion, Justice Relmquist relied on the FWPCAA's establishment
of a comprehensive regulatory program. Id. The Act did establish a comprehensive
long-range policy. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Justice Rehnquist, how-
ever, strained the meaning of this expression.
"A comprehensive long-term policy" arguably differs from "a comprehensive stat-
ute." The former indicates an all-encompassing solitary objective. "A comprehensive
statute" represents only one cohesive route toward achieving that objective. The
word "a," unlike the word "the," is totally inclusive only when modified by descrip-
tive words, e.g single, only, long, short, etc. "An" option indicates the presence of
one option. It does not preclude other options whereas "the" option does preclude all
other options. When Congress refers to, "a" comprehensive statute, it intends just
that. It is important to recognize this distinction when examining the Court's analysis
in the principal case.
The majority mistakenly relied on the Congressional proponents' characterization
of the FWPCAA as comprehensive. As the dissent poignantly observed, proponents
of prior water pollution legislation advance similar claims of statutory comprehen-
siveness. 451 U.S. at 342 n.13.
The EPA General Counsel's response to a letter from Senator Griffin bolsters the
dissent's interpretation. The General Counsel wrote that: "It is reasonable to con-
clude that the courts will not interpret any legislation to deprive them of jurisdiction
of pending litigation in the absence of clear and explicit language. There is no clear
and explicit language to this effect in the bill." I LEG. HIST., supra note 52, at 193
(emphasis added). Representing the Executive Branch of the United States, the Solic-
itor General, Assistant Attorney General, and Attorney of the E.P.A.'s brief strongly
urged the Court to find that the FWPCAA did not preempt or limit the federal com-
mon law of nuisance governing water pollution. Brief of the Solicitor General for the
United States, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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an "expert administrative agency" buttressed this finding. 89 These
actions, the Court concluded, demonstrated Congress' implicit inten-
tion to eliminate all non-statutory remedies. 90
The Court directed the second part of its analysis to whether reme-
dies provided by the Amendments displaced those formerly available
under federal common law.91 In concluding that the statutory reme-
dies now governed the field,92 the majority adopted an exceedingly
narrow interpretation of Section 505(e), the savings clause.93 The
Court preserved only those remedies enumerated within Section 505
and those provided by existing state common law.94 This interpreta-
tion, which is contrary to several lower appellate court views,95 ap-
89. 451 U.S. at 317.
90. Id. at 323-26. Federal courts, the majority contended, "lack authority to im-
pose more stringent effluent limitations under federal common law than those im-
posed by the agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehensive
scheme." ld. at 320.
91. Id. at 327-32.
92. Id. at 332.
93. Id. at 328. Examining the provision's language (see supra note 57) Justice
Rehnquist ruled that "we. .. are inclined to view the quoted provision as meaning
what it says: that nothing in § 505, the citizen-suit provision, should be read as limit-
ing any other remedies which might exist." Id. The majority further asserted
§ 505(3) ". . . most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not
supplant formerly available federal common-law actions, but only that the particular
section authorizing citizen suits does not do so." Id. at 329. The dissent strenuously
challenged the majority's reading of the provision. Id. at 339-44 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
The Court also found no basis for using federal common law to enforce state regu-
lations adopted pursuant to § 510 (see supra note 54) that exceeded the minimum
requirements established by Congress and the EPA. The Court interpreted Section
510 as to "contemplate state authority to establish more stringent pollution limita-
tions; nothing in it, however, suggests that this was to be done by federal court actions
premised on federal common law." 451 U.S. at 328. One might question whether
Congress would provide a right but implicitly deny the enforcement of that right.
Congress made clear, moreover, that federal officers and agencies can adopt or en-
force stricter pollution controls and standards than those required by the act. (See
§ 511(a)). See 451 U.S. at 314 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This indicates Congress'
intent for federal courts to enforce all authorized state pollution limitations, including
those exceeding the floor established by Congress and the regulatory agency.
94. Id. at 319 n.14.
95. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussed
supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); California
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed
supra at notes 64-70 and accompanying text). See also 451 U.S. at 340 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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pears to further the majority's desire to limit the federal judiciary's
discretion in utilizing federal common law in the absence of express
congressional approval.9
6
The Court's preemption analysis alters the prior standard for pre-
emption employed in California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v.
Jennings,9 7 United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel,98 and the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.99 The former
standard required a showing that Congress "expressly or clearly
manifested" an intent to preempt federal common law. "00 While the
opinion makes clear that the Court no longer thinks this necessary,' 01
the Court's new test fails to specify what type of congressional action
suffices to preempt an area from federal interstitial lawmaking. I 2
The new test undercuts the implicit understanding of preceding cases
that a court must examine both the words and spirit of a statute
96. See 451 U.S. at 319 n.14, 329 n.22.
97. 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed supra at notes 64-70 and accompany-
ing text).
98. 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. I11. 1973) (discussed supra at notes 58-63).
99. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussed supra at notes 71-75 and accompany-
ing text).
100. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
101. See 451 U.S. at 319 n.14.
102. See supra note 79. The Court's failure to clarify any of the broad tests it
enumerated may lead to inconsistent results. More significantly, however, a lower
court, depending on the test applied, could invalidate an entire region of federal com-
mon law simply by noting that Congress "addressed" a question. A recent case dem-
onstrates this problem. In United States v. Kinbuc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J.
1982), the federal government, alleging violation of the FWPCAA, sought penalties
against a landfill operated as a disposal site for municipal, industrial, and chemical
wastes. The government based its damage claim on the federal common law of nui-
sance for air and water pollution. The court dismissed the common law claim for
damages for water pollution in light of Milwaukee v. Illinois. When it addressed the
common law claim for damages for air pollution, the court summarily dismissed de-
fendant's argument.
Relying on Milwaukee v. Illinois, the court held that the proper test to apply is
"whether the scope of the legislative scheme established by Congress is such that it
addresses the problem formerly governed by federal common law." Id. at 702. After
a cursory examination of the Clean Air Act's legislative history, the court decided that
the Act establishes a complete regulatory procedure whereby pollutants are identified,
air quality standards are set, and procedures for strict enforcement are created. The
court correctly quoted Milwaukee v. Illinois for the general principle that "when Con-
gress occupies the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory pro-
gram supervised by an expert administrative agency, there is no need for federal
common law." Id. Based on this reasoning, the court found that the Clean Air Act
preempted federal common law. Id. at 703.
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before determining whether the act preempts federal common law.' 3
Milwaukee v. Illinois effectively eliminates the federal common law
rights and remedies previously complementing the FWPCAA.I°4 Af-
ter this decision, state pollution controls more restrictive than those
imposed by the federal government have no adequate legal enforce-
ment remedy available in interstate forums. This result frustrates the
congressional policy of preventing, reducing, and eliminating pollu-
tion. ' 5 The Court's new test means that Congress, to preserve rights
and remedies existing under federal common law, must specifically
state its intentions within a separate section at the beginning or end of
an act. By requiring such a savings clause as Section 505(e), the
Court transferred federal protection of a state's quasi-sovereign eco-
logical rights from the realm of equity to that of politics.
Alan M. Cohen
103. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
104. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (the federal common law of nuisance has been fully pre-empted in
the area of water pollution by the FWPCAA).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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